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Abstract

Rural insurrections in Third World nations transformed the study of agrarian politics into a recognized subfield of political development. They also discredited prevailing development theories and while rendering development studies a subfield of political economy.

This essay reviews the major approaches to the study of agrarian politics. It emphasizes two major weaknesses: the assumption that development implies the demise of the rural sector and the inability of most "economic" approaches to incorporate institutional features of peasant societies, thereby creating a wasteful disjuncture between political economy and anthropology in the study of rural societies.

The collective choice approach, it is argued, rectifies these weaknesses and generates a fruitful agenda for new research into the political economy of Third World nations.

AGRARIAN POLITICS AND DEVELOPMENT

ROBERT H. BATES

Political development became a recognized field in political science in the late 1950s. Shortly thereafter, the study of the politics of rural populations emerged as an active and contentious subfield in development studies. A principal reason for the growth of the study of agrarian politics was the "surprise value" offered by rural radicalism; the political behavior of rural populations violated the expectations that were generated by the dominant theories in development studies. One of the major consequences of the rise of rural studies was a major shift in theoretical perspectives: political development rapidly became a subfield of political economy. Peasant rebellions overthrew not only governments but also intellectual traditions.

One purpose of this essay is to recount the growth of the interest in agrarian politics. A second is to comment upon it. A third and last objective is to outline what I regard as being an appropriate form of political economy for development.

The Passive Sector

Reviewing the standard works of the early development literature discloses a characteristic pattern of thought and, within that pattern, a characteristic treatment of agrarian populations. Early theorizing was marked by an awkward combination of both static and dynamic elements. The statics took the form of ideal types: traditional and modern components of society were defined in terms of a distinctive combination of traits coexisting at particular moments in time. The dynamics were captured in the combination of such constructs: development was held to involve a passage from one ideal type to another. Within this form of analysis, the agrarian sector was consigned to the "traditional" category. The dynamic forces that induced development originated within the "modern" sector and rural society was held to be the recipient of the forces of change. It was what was modernized as part of the development process.

Early work in developmental politics was dominated by such "typological theorizing." Talcott Parsons, for example, derived from his critical review of the classic sociologists -- Weber, Durkheim, Toennies, and others -- his list of "pattern variables" which generated a dichotomous categorization of human societies. One type was affective, diffuse, particularistic and collectivity-oriented; the

other was affectively neutral, specific, universalistic and self-oriented. Rural societies belonged to the first category; urban and industrial societies belonged to the second. Clearly the modernization of any society required its movements from the first category to the second.[1]

The polarities outlined by Parsons found their parallel in the work of others. Despite early cautions against such usage, the "traditional-modern" dichotomy was echoed in virtually every major work in the field.[2] Even more clearly, the habits of thought established by typological theorizing implicitly located the dynamic growth points of development in the urban and industrial sectors.

Two of the earliest contributions to the study of developmental politics serve to illustrate these contentions, the works of Daniel Lerner and Karl Deutsch. In his seminal study, Lerner classified people as modern the more they held political opinions and were capable of "empathy," i.e. of conceiving themselves in positions other than those which they occupied in their day to day lives. Lerner moved from static classification to dynamic analysis through the time-honored legerdemain of promoting correlation to causation: he established that the more modern were those who possessed literacy, access to the mass media, and dwelt in urban areas, and he located the cause of the transition to modernity in the growth of education, the media, and towns.[3] The passage of traditional society thus became the parable of the grocer and the chief. The pre-literate, isolated village was the locus of tradition and development began with the establishment of

roads and a bus route to the city, the growth of education, and the intrusion of the urban-based mass media. Modernization took place when rural society was penetrated by forces arising from without.

Deutsch's work paralleled closely that of Lerner. While reluctant to posit such psychological qualities as empathy as central to the development process, Deutsch nonetheless concurred in affirming that the growth of literacy and education were. Deutsch amplified as well Lerner's conviction that modernization involved a movement away from rural life. He pointed to the growth of industrial employment and urbanization as characteristic features of the social mobilization of underdeveloped societies.

Lerner and Deutsch possessed a common research objective: to discover the origins of mass politics. For Lerner, empathy was important because it facilitated the holding of political opinions and therefore provided the basis for participant politics; for Deutsch, social mobilization was critical because it represented a prelude to involvement in nationalist movements. These early milestones in development studies therefore helped to structure a characteristic image of the political role of the rural areas. Not only did modernization involve a movement away from rural society, but also rural society was politically inert: it was unmobilized, its people lacked political sophistication, and they were incapable and unwilling to take the political initiative and thereby shape their own political future or that of their societies. Rural dwelling was equated with political apathy.

It is therefore understandable why early researchers, in studying the transformation from traditional to modern societies, tended to shy away from study of village dwellers and to focus instead on the "modernizing" sectors. They concentrated on the formation of urban elites and the resultant growth of nationalist politics.[4] They studied bureaucrats, administrators and planners.[5] They investigated the behavior of businessmen and entrepreneurs[6] and those in command of the mass media.[7] Their inattention to rural populations is striking but unsurprising, given the habits of thought of the time.

The rural sector was, of course, not entirely ignored. But, where it was addressed, it was treated in characteristic form. Illustrative is the work of Everett Rogers, which represents a major attempt by those within this early tradition to analyze the rural areas.[8] The majority of peasant producers, according to Rogers, belonged to the "traditional sector" of developing societies. While hard working, perforce, they were illiterate and tradition-bound. They tended to be apathetic and, left to their own devices, unresponsive to new ideas. What led to the transformation of traditional agriculture was the introduction of new technologies from the outside. Farmers who were more literate and better educated, and who were tied to the modern sector through their participation in social and media networks ramifying from the city, would adopt the new technologies and diffuse them through the rest of rural society.

Rogers' work was widely read by students of political development in part, I should think, because it worked so closely within the

intellectual framework which they themselves employed. It combined the static and dynamic elements of typological reasoning. The rural sector clearly was cast as the embodiment of tradition. The majority of its members were held to be passive. And the transformation to modernity was to be initiated from without.

Backward, apathetic, passive: the agrarian segment was portrayed as socially and economically inert.

The Active Society

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, everything changed. The intellectual orthodoxy in development studies was overthrown. And a central reason was the widespread recognition that it had failed to analyze correctly the nature of agrarian politics in developing societies.

As traumatically underscored by Vietnam, quite obviously agrarian societies were not passive and inert. Revolutionaries could tap and direct powerful political forces within rural societies and thereby shape the pace and direction of historical change. Rarely has any social theory been confronted with so convincing an array of discordant facts. And with the challenge to the manner in which it analyzed the rural areas, modernization theory was itself attacked and largely supplanted as a form of social thought.

Tinkering with the Tradition:

While it is the new sources of theory which I will stress, it should be recognized that many scholars continued to operate within the conventional paradigm. Some located the origins of political violence in the "breakdown" of traditional societies under the disruptive impact of modernizing forces.[9] Others explained it in terms of the growth of expectations engendered by rising incomes, the spread urban life styles, and the whetting of consumer appetites.[10] Still others stressed the growth of new interest groups and the rise of new social forces which were created by the process of social change and which sought to claim political power in efforts to advance their own interests and political agendas.[11] By promoting social disintegration, the growth of wants and the mobilization of new interests, modernization, it was recognized, could lead to political violence.

In its attempts to deal with the fact of political revolution in backward societies, the dominant tradition introduced two further amendments. One was a renewed stress on the inherently political. This is best marked by the emphasis on the significance of political organization which marked much of the literature on insurgency. Revolutionary parties, it was held, capitalize on the political opportunities created by the modernization process. Through the creation of local "cells" and front organizations, and through the propagation of political ideologies, insurgent political organizations offer socially and psychologically meaningful forms of membership and participation; they thereby offer a substitute for the loss of primary

community experienced with the breakdown of tradition. The parties also offer opportunities for upward mobility; possibilities for advancement are attractive in societies characterized by frustrated desires for progress. While focused about a disciplined core of true believers, insurrectionary parties also cast an inclusive net of ancillary political organizations in an effort to incorporate and channel the political energies of newly emergent political interests. Revolutionary and destabilizing political organizations, it would appear, were designed to take advantage of the politically explosive features of the modernization process.[12]

The focus on violence thus brought a renewed emphasis on the overtly political. It also placed emphasis on the study of agrarian change. In the analysis of agrarian politics, political scientists drew from three major literatures. One was formed by the work of anthropologists.[13] Another was composed of studies of land tenure and land reform.[14] The third was made up of research into rural development, much of which was carried out by persons affiliated with international aid programs.[15]

There is little point in expositing these literatures, however, for what was critical was that once the rural origins of political violence were seriously investigated, the nature of scholarship itself changed. Political scientists turned to a host of works on agrarian societies which most had hitherto ignored. In addition to those just mentioned, they turned to the rich and voluminous literatures on pre-industrial Europe and the agrarian societies of Asia, India, South-East

Asia, and Latin America. They also turned to new intellectual traditions. In pursuit of ways to analyze the politics of agrarian societies, they synthesized these materials from new perspectives. Put short, a major consequence of the rise of rural studies was to render developmental politics a subfield of political economy.

International Political Economy

Recognition of the fact of peasant revolution largely discredited the initial orthodoxies. In search of a new intellectual framework, many political scientists adopted an international perspective. The world economy, they argued, constituted a single unified system driven by the imperatives of capitalism. The growth of capitalism in the developed world resulted from the exploitation of the periphery and, in particular, of the backward economies which produced raw materials and agricultural commodities. Through Prebisch-like mechanisms of declining terms of trade, Emmanuel-like mechanisms of embodied labor power, or through the agency of the multi-national corporation, resources flowed from the periphery to the center.[16] The backwardness of the periphery thus stood as the necessary corollary of the development of the center. In a sense, then, the underdeveloped areas -- the producers of agricultural and raw materials -- assumed the position of an exploited international stratum. From their structural location in the world economy derived their revolutionary potential.[17]

This line of analysis found its origins in debates among Marxists

in the early twentieth century. One debate concerned the revolutionary potential of the eastern portions of Europe. Another represented an attempt to comprehend the political behavior of the working class in World War I, and, in particular, to understand its tendency to behave as if it possessed an identity of interests with domestic capitalist classes. Both debates represented attempts to understand the dynamics of imperialism. And an important inference drawn from both was that the major conflict of interests characterizing mature capitalist economies were inter- as opposed to intra-national, with capitalist accumulation leading to the relative prosperity of all segments of the "mature" economies at the expense of the more backward.[18] In the second half of the century, these early writings were revived by Baran and Sweezy and even later by Wallerstein and Frank.[19] In various guises, they took the form of a major alternative to -- and challenge to -- the modernization school of development.

One of the primary contributions of this literature was to provide an answer to the question: Why should political violence take place in the underdeveloped areas? Classically, conflict theories tend to be Marxist; and an additional contribution of this approach was that it helped to explain to Marxists why revolution should take place in pre-industrial societies. Thirdly, and most important for this paper, under the impact of this literature, the study of underdevelopment became the study of the perpetuation of agrarianism. The transition from agriculture became the hallmark of development.

While rapidly displacing modernization theory, this approach

nonetheless exhibited several critical deficiencies. A key weakness was the tendency to lump all the major segments of an underdeveloped country into broad and undifferentiated categories: those segments which operated on behalf of the extractive world economy and those segments which were exploited and therefore underdeveloped. Such broad dichotomizations represented little by way of an advance of the crude categorizations of the modernization theorists. Moreover, this dichotomization failed to highlight the conflicts of interest existing within the underdeveloped societies themselves; it therefore offered little insight into the intra-national sources of underdevelopment. In this regard, it is important to recognize that the origins of this tradition lay in tactical debates; they lay in part in the efforts of revolutionaries to promote cross-class alliances within developing nations and thereby to lay the foundations for the overthrow of the imperialist powers. The theory of capitalist underdevelopment thus represented a tactically motivated species of nationalism, based upon populist assumptions of a uniformity of interests of persons in third-world societies. As many Marxists were quick to note, it therefore made more sense as a political doctrine which legitimates the formation of inter-class alliances than as a method of class analysis.[20]

The failure to differentiate among domestic segments of the developing economies and to recognize conflicts of interest among them led to a third major flaw: the failure to comprehend the dynamics of the transition from agrarianism. This failure imposed as well limitations on the ability to adequately comprehend the origins of

rural protest. In particular, the manufacturing and industrial sectors -- the sectors whose rise to ascendancy stands as the hallmark of the development process -- seek to extract resources -- labor, capital, and raw materials -- from the rural sector. And with the growth of domestic economies, important conflicts of interest break out within the rural segment itself. The populist assumption of uniform interests within the developing economies obscured the significance of these internal dynamics. It therefore provided little by way of an understanding of the set of grievances which impelled rural dwellers to political action in response to the development process.

Domestic Political Economy

A second current in the literature approached the study of agrarian politics from the point of view of the domestic, as opposed to international, political economy. This strand, too, implicitly defined development as a movement from a rural and agrarian to an urban and industrial society. But it located the sources of political conflict within the developing world. Many of these it attributed to struggles occasioned by the development process itself, and, in particular, by efforts to secure the redistribution of resources from the rural to the urban areas -- resources with which to effect "the great transformation."

Two major schools of thought dominate the "intra-national" tradition. One is based upon conventional development economics and will be labeled the theory of structural change; the second is based upon Marxian economics and is called the theory of primitive

accumulation. Both antedate the international tradition of the political economy of development as well as the field of political development itself. While the intellectual and political explosions of the late 1960s drove development specialists to theories of imperialism, more recent efforts to analyze the role of agriculture in the development process have returned to these two schools -- schools of political economy which locate the political dynamics of development within the domestic economy.

Both versions concur in the basic definition of development: development is defined as the growth of the (per capita) gross domestic product. Both also concur in their perception of the implication for the rural sector. A necessary condition for growth, they contend, is the decline in the proportion of the national product originating from agriculture. Notationally, their basic argument can be summarized as:

$$\frac{d\ GDP}{dt} > 0 \implies \frac{d\ Ag./GDP}{dt} < 0,$$

where GDP represents the value of the gross domestic product; Ag. represents the value of agricultural production; and t stands for time.

Within "conventional" development economics, the work of such noted scholars as Kuznets, Rostow, Lewis and Chenery pointed to the structural transformation of the origins of the gross domestic product as the most meaningful regularity marking the growth of national economies and the rise over time of per capita incomes.[21] In the spirit of these works, many scholars studied the domestic origins of

development by examining the ways in which agriculture released resources -- labor, capital, and raw materials -- to the growing off-farm sectors of the economy.[22]

From this perspective, the study of agrarian politics becomes the study of three major themes. The first and most pervasive is the struggle over the terms of trade between the rural and urban areas. Politics centers on the contest for control over the extent to which rural resources are rewarded as they contribute to the growth of the non-farm sector. And the study of agrarian politics therefore focuses on such diverse events as the "scissors crisis" in the Soviet Union, the McKinley tariff and "parity" in the United States, and the corn laws in England.[23] From this point of view, the study of agrarian politics also becomes the study of the politics of rural decline. It becomes a study of the way in which what was once the core of the economy is displaced and marginalized as part of the development process. In some instances, the process entails the vanquishing of a stubborn and resistant rural sector; collectivization in the Soviet Union is a case in point. In others, it is marked by efforts to co-opt or to compensate the elites of the declining rural sector: land rights are exchanged for securities and financial instruments, in the case of Japan; tariffs on rye for tariffs on iron, as in Prussia; or elite positions in the feudal political economy for elite positions in the industrializing state bureaucracy -- a trend which has been related to the rise of militaristic patterns of state-led industrialization in several developing nations.[24] Lastly, the structural transformation

interpretation of the development process leads to the study of conflicts within the rural areas themselves, as the more efficient farmers displace their less efficient brethren, who then abandon the declining rural sector and assume the role of urban immigrants or industrial proletarians.

The Marxian alternative to the structural transformation approach is the theory of primitive accumulation. While those who view development as a structural transformation tend to stress that development leads to an expansion of economic opportunities and therefore to gains for all, the Marxian approach stresses that there are winners and losers in the development process and that development is fundamentally based on forceful expropriation. Rapidly sketched out by Marx in his analysis of British industrialization, the theory of primitive accumulation locates the origins of industrial capitalism in agriculture. The rise of dynamic, large-scale farming leads to the separation of the mass of the rural population from the means of production. And it is through the development of wage labor that the owners of capital are able to secure access to surplus value and thereby achieve the power to accumulate and thus generate economic growth.[25]

With the movement to radical political economy in the 1960s and 1970s, there was a major revival of interest in Marx's thesis. This revival helped to establish several major themes in the study of agrarian politics. One of the most prominent was the thesis of immiseration: economic growth was based upon the forceful deracination

of the peasantry and their involuntary entry into the burgeoning industrial centers. This theme has long echoed through the history of British industrialization[26]; it was revived in the 1960s in the justly famous work of E. J. P. Thompson[27]; and while it is strongly and persuasively challenged in the works of Hartwell, Chambers, and the Cambridge demographic historians, it retains the status of orthodoxy in development studies.[28] A second and closely related conviction derived from Marx's analysis: that industrialization required not just the bidding of resources from agriculture to more productive (and thus more highly rewarded) uses in the industrial sector -- as the structural transformation thesis would have it -- but rather their forceful expropriation from agriculture. Coercion, not exchange, provides the motor of economic growth. Such a conviction underlay not only Marx's historical vision of the origins of capitalism but also the theory of primitive socialist accumulation as propounded in the industrialization debates in the Soviet Union.[29] More surprising, this view has dominated much of western development economics as well, with many practitioners advocating the "squeezing" of agriculture as a means of securing rapid growth.[30] While strongly challenged by empirical investigations of the history of British industrialization,[31] the presumption that the resources for development should and could be forcefully extracted from the rural sector remains a basic assumption in the development field. Lastly, the revival of the theory of primitive accumulation fixed a third major theme in development studies: the theme of rural class struggle. According to this

interpretation, the origins of the working class lay in the fight for control over land, the primary means of rural production. Whether in the form of the "mir-eating" Kulak or his putative counterpart, the prosperous Tanzanian peasant; in the triumph of capitalist agriculture in Britain and corporate agriculture in the United States; or in the rise of cash-cropping plantations and export enclaves throughout the third world, the commercialization of agriculture was seen as promoting the ascendancy of a dominant agrarian class and the concomitant expropriation of the mass of rural producers.

Both the structural transformation and the primitive accumulation theories of the role of agriculture in economic development are heavily macro- in orientation: they analyze the transformation of whole economics. Before turning to the "micro-" literature, it is interesting to note the ways in which these macro- traditions stand as commentaries upon alternative approaches to the study of development. For both, the origins of development lie in the rural sector. For the structural transformation school, it is the progressive rightward drift of the agricultural supply function that sets in motion the "Mills/Marshall treadmill" and leads to the sustained flow of resources from the agrarian to the industrial sector. For the primitive accumulation school, the origins of development lie in capitalist agriculture and the efforts of commercially minded owners of rural property to expand and so compete in the market place. In contrast to the modernization school, both forms of political economy thus insist that development does not originate from the orchestrated intervention

of the modern sector upon the backward agrarian segments of society. Rather it is the rural sector which furnishes the impetus to the development process.

These literatures also stand as a criticism of the dependency school. The primary determinants of development do not lie in the international economy, they hold; rather, agrarian economies possess the potential for self-transformation. What is to be studied, then, is not market relations between the domestic and international economy, but rather the relations between industry and agriculture and between class segments within the rural sector itself. It is striking that Lenin in his criticism of the Narodniks overtly advanced this thesis in his Origins of Capitalism in Russia. But, at least in the 1970s, most scholars took their direction from his study of imperialism and its emphasis on the external determinants of economic growth.[32]

Peasant Studies

As both literatures evolved, it should be stressed, a significant dissident group emerged. Its members belonged to what I shall call the "peasant studies" school. It differed from the structural transformation and primitive accumulation schools in several major respects. It was more micro- in orientation; its practitioners focused on small-scale peasant societies. Both the structural transformation and primitive accumulation schools were heavily "economist"; the fundamental dynamics of agrarian society were supplied by economic forces. The dissidents were far less convinced of the preeminence of economic forces; they

stressed instead the significance of social institutions and cultural values. The peasant studies school also sought to answer the basic question which motivated the original turn to agrarian politics: what were the origins of political violence in developing countries? But the answer it supplied was that the origins of violence lay in the rejection by peasant communities of the economic forces unleashed upon them by the growth of capitalism.

The "peasant studies" approach to the study of agrarian politics drew upon two major strands of social thought. One was the work of Polanyi, who saw agrarian societies as pre-capitalist and based upon notions of social reciprocity.[33] Another was Marx´s notion of the natural economy, in which value was determined by use rather than exchange and in which commoditization, particularly of labor, had not arisen.[34] Both approaches rejected market economics on methodological and ethical grounds. Agrarian societies were organized on principles other than economic exchange, it was held, and allocations within them were determined by factors other than supply and demand and the resultant formation of prices. Rather, resources were distributed in accordance with social values and in conformity with normatively prescribed patterns of social organization. Moreover, the institutional arrangements of rural societies were able to secure social states which were ethically preferable to those sustained by markets. Among the most important of these values was equity and, in particular, equality of access to endowments with which to secure survival. Whereas in market economies one could starve for want of

ability to purchase commodities, in peasant societies, community membership guaranteed to everyone access to the resources with which to survive. In this fundamental sense, the peasant societies were more moral; they constituted a normatively superior alternative to the market.[35]

From this perspective, the origins of political violence were clear. Peasant movements constituted an anti-capitalist reaction to the growth of markets. And the basic sense of outrage which these movements expressed was based upon the peasants´ refusal to to relegate the fate of the disadvantaged to the impersonal operations of the market.

For some, the anti-capitalist themes of peasant rebellions represented a reactionary appeal. Certainly this was the classically Marxist point of view, which saw the peasantry as posing the economic danger of perpetuating a pre-capitalist and unproductive mode of production and the political danger of providing a political base for those reactionary forces who wished to use the political weight of the countryside to oppose the industrializing forces of the urban centers.[36] It is also the point of view of such contemporary scholars as Goran Hyden, who sees peasant-based economies as possessing the capacity to elude the market and to undermine the state and thereby forestall the transfer of resources necessary to secure development.[37] For others, however, the anti-capitalist mentality of the peasantry was progressive. The moral themes of peasant rebellions offered foundations for the establishment of a post-capitalist, rather than

pre-capitalist, social order. In the spirit of the Narodniks, they saw the social and cultural principles of the countryside as adumbrating a just social order. For these scholars, the peasantry stood as a revolutionary force.[38]

The ambiguity that arises in the micro-literature concerning the role of the peasantry in development extends beyond assessments of its ethical and political tendencies to assessments of it economic performance. Some see the economic properties of peasant production as a threat to economic development. One reason offered is that peasants control their own means of production and do not depend upon markets; in particular, it is held, they do not buy or sell labor power. The result is that they engage in self-exploitation and so transfer little surplus to other sectors. It is also held that the peasant farm, unlike the capitalist farm, is a unit of consumption as well as production. Because peasants produce only to consume, it is held, they will produce less as agricultural prices rise; they therefore cannot be relied upon to supply the market. Moreover, because they expend whatever resources are required to sustain the family household, they drive up the price of land to levels beyond what considerations of commercial advantage require; from a purely economic point of view, rural resources are therefore allocated inefficiently, as market-oriented as opposed to consumption-oriented producers are unable to compete for land.[39]

From an opposite point of view, however, the very features that are seen by some as posing a danger are interpreted by others as a

blessing. For the non-economic orientation of the peasantry, these others contend, can be manipulated by the non-farm sector to turn the terms of trade of agriculture to their advantage. For example, the "backward bending" supply response of peasants can be manipulated to secure more abundant supplies of farm products at lower prices. And the peasantry's capacity for self-exploitation means that industrializers can "starve" the peasant sector of inputs, relying upon the peasantry to substitute increased levels of labor power in an effort to sustain their households in an adverse economic environment. The "non-capitalist" features of peasant production can thus be exploited by the non-farm sector to secure rural production more cheaply, both in terms of product prices and off-farm inputs. While viewed by those who do micro-studies as pre-capitalist and anti-industrial, the peasantry can nonetheless be exploited to secure the growth of capitalism.[40]

The tendency of the literature of the 1960s and 1970s, then, was to view development in terms of the growth of industrialization. Within that framework, clearly, the rural sector occupied an anomalous position. For some, the peasantry posed a political danger; for others, it was the harbinger of a just political future. For most, it was a pre-industrial fragment -- a residue of tradition. To some, it therefore posed a threat to capitalism; to others, it posed an opportunity. To paraphrase the title of one of the classics of the literature, the peasantry was an ambiguous class.[41]

It has been convenient thus far to discuss the micro-literature in

the context of the broader themes that arise in political economy -- themes relating to "the rise of capitalism" and thus to the "peasant question." The risk of such a presentational strategy, however, is that we may overlook the more purely sociological portions.

From the sociological perspective there is no "peasant." At best there is a wide variety of peasants and, more properly, there is a wide variety of rural types of which the peasant is but one. The peasant is contrasted with the tribesman who in turn is contrasted with the hunter and gatherer;[42] the point at which a rural dweller becomes a peasant remains hotly contested.[43] Moreover, within any given rural society, it is the variety of sizes and types of rural dwellers which receives attention. Some own small farms; others, large ones. Some possess capital; others do not. Some borrow; others lend. Some sell labor; others hire it. Some have access to off-farm incomes; others do not. Some work as traders or artisans; others, solely as farmers.

Persons within the sociological tradition stress such variation in part because their research agenda is dominated by the need to account for the permanence and stability of contrasting forms of human behavior; thus, too, their preoccupation with socialization, an issue of little interest to political economists. But they also underscore the variety of forms of rural society in an effort to employ empirical materials to challenge the power of social theories. If the relevant measure of explanatory power is the percent of variation explained, then what the sociologists are pointing to is the magnitude of the variation which must be accounted for. This tactic provokes modesty

and stands as a challenge to any approach to the study of rural society.

The sociological tradition challenges not only the tendency to oversimplify, as when referring to all rural dwellers as peasants; it also challenges the tendency to invoke methodological individualism, as by employing the household as the relevant unit of analysis. It does this by insisting that rural households do not stand alone; rather, they are embedded within broader social institutions. Moreover, it is these social structures which stand between the rural dwellers and the outside world, and which therefore should be analyzed when studying the incorporation of rural societies into market systems and the state.

Some sociologists focus on kinship systems and lineages.[44] Others focus on village systems.[45] Still others look at castes and/or tribes.[46] Others look at ethnic groups.[47] And others study systems of rural stratification and patron-client relations.[48] Moreover, sociologists have developed full literatures devoted to examining the way in which each of these social institutions has reacted to incorporation into the larger systems of market and political relations. The "African literature," for example, contains an enormous range of materials concerning the incorporation, or lack of it, of tribal groups and ethnic communities.[49] Srinivas and others have looked at the way in which castes use "modern" sources of wealth and power to pursue "traditional" objectives of upward mobility.[50] Scott, Wolfe, Migdal, Popkin and others have examined the interaction of "closed villages" with the external market and the intrusive nation

state.[51] These examples could easily be multiplied and expanded.

The sociological literature thus rejects any premise of uniformity in rural social forms. It attacks the premise of methodological individualism, even at the level of the rural household. And it stresses the importance of larger social institutions and underscores their vitality and significance, particularly at the point in which rural societies are being incorporated into national and international political economies.

Discussion and Future Research

The confrontation with the peasant question led to the precipitate displacement of the modernization school and to the rendering of developmental politics a sub-field of political economy. The forms of political economy brought to bear upon development studies clearly vary. For purposes of this essay, I have isolated four.

Perhaps the most fundamental weakness in these literatures arises from the basic theme which most schools hold in common: the presumption that development requires the transition from an agrarian to an industrial society. At the outset, however, and solely for purposes of argument, I leave this assumption unchallenged. For, historically, development has involved such a transition. And given that that is true, two topics, both drawn from history, claim positions on the research agenda.

If development has entailed a movement away from agrarianism, then there is a crying need for comparative analysis. How have different

societies undergone this transition? Why have they differed in the speed with which the transition has been made? Why in some cases was the transition violent while in others it was peaceful? How was the transition politically managed: who took the lead in initiating it, who opposed it, and who brought the process to fruition? Moore, Skocpol, Brenner and others have shown the value of such comparative analysis.[52] The work of these contemporaries provokes renewed respect for the work of the classical economists and the nineteenth-century social theorists who took as their subject the impact of industrialization and the division of labor upon western society. Comparative history -- and specifically the comparative history of the transition from agrarianism -- thus becomes a prime candidate for scholarly research, given this perspective on the field.[53]

A second item on the research agenda would also draw upon history. Many of the development policies adopted by contemporary governments are chosen because "everyone knows" they were the way in which development was secured in an earlier era. I am convinced that many of these lessons have been wrongly inferred and that contemporary development strategists may be the victims of misreadings of history. One of the major contributions which historians can make is to reexamine these lessons. Does rapid development require the growth of large, capital intensive farms? Many policy makers and intellectuals believe that history shows this to be true. But is the record so clear? Most certainly not.[54] Does rapid development in fact require the driving of peasants from off the land? Was the capital for

industrialization in fact accumulated from the countryside? Historical research suggests that these beliefs are not valid; standard assumptions about the development process should therefore be revised.[55] Are peasants easily enticed into debt and their lands seized by acquisitive money lenders? Is share tenancy a form of exploitation and one that leads to economic stagnation? These "lessons of history," largely drawn from British experiences in the Indian subcontinent, are also controversial.[56] Clearly, a critical reevaluation of historical encounters with the peasantry is in order. As what has been learned from the past informs policy choices in the present, such a reexamination of the historical record would be of the greatest significance.

The study of these topics is relevant insofar as development, historically, has entailed the economic and political marginalization of agriculture. Scholars commonly assume this marginalization to be necessary for development. A major problem with this conviction is that it transforms history into teleology; the direction of change in the past is taken to signify an end state toward which all societies must converge -- an end state which is labeled development. Apart from questionable logic, this presumption runs afoul the problem of feasibility: given the sectorial composition of such developing countries as China, India or Kenya, for example, the rates of industrial growth required to transform them from rural societies is so massive as to be virtually unattainable. As a defining property of development, this transformation may therefore be insufficiently

general to be of relevance to many third-world nations. A clear implication is that the politics of agriculture in these nations must have origins other than these transformational dynamics.

Topics in Rural Studies:

A rapid transition from agrarianism may well be infeasible. But the significance and relevance of rural studies remains. Indeed it is heightened by the prospect that the size and relative magnitude of the rural sector will endure for the foreseeable future in most third-world nations. The political issues that have been studied by those who believe in the relevance of the "great transformation" should continue to be studied as a part of the analysis of agrarian politics. They do not in fact become less significant simply because the prospects of industrialization are dimmed.

The fights between sectors endure: wage earners want cheap food and industrialists low-priced raw materials, whereas agricultural producers would like higher prices for their products. Within agricultural industries, producers, consumers, and processors compete in efforts to capture a privileged share of the profits. Producers of different sizes compete for dominance in the rural sector. Conflicts center on access to land, the level of rents, and the structure of rural property rights. They center on access to labor, the level of wages, and the form of its organization. They center on access to farm inputs: water, traction power, credit, and off-farm inputs such as chemicals, fertilizers, and public services. Precisely insofar as the rural sector remains ascendant, this mix of issues constitutes a major

portion of the stuff of politics in the developing areas. Given their prominence on the political agenda, their study should be prominent on the research agenda as well.

In addition, just because scholars question the feasibility of the transition to industrialization does not mean that others share their reservations. In particular, there exists a "development coalition" -- of industrialists, urban wage earners, bureaucrats, and intellectuals -- in many of the developing countries who see the future prosperity of their nations tied to their ability to secure rapid industrialization and who are committed to elicit, if necessary, the transfer of resources from agriculture by which to secure this transformation. In many countries, these interests dominate policy making: they set agricultural prices, they staff and manage marketing agencies, and they administer the public bureaucracies which structure the economic and political environment of rural producers. They systematically intervene in the policy process so as to pursue development, by which they tend to mean undergoing the same structural transformation that took place with the growth of the major industrial powers. The organization of this development coalition, its intervention in the policy process, and the links it maintains and mobilizes in the international development community -- these are subjects which must be researched.

Many of the nations of the third world contain populations which are overwhelmingly rural in composition. Their economies are agrarian. For the foreseeable future, these societies are likely to remain that

way. And precisely for these reasons, it is sensible and important to approach the study of the political economy of third-world nations by analyzing the politics of agricultural policy-making.[57] This subject deserves pride of place in the research agenda.

Approach to the Subject:

In the study of these topics, what intellectual framework should be applied? A lesson drawn from the overview of the field thus far is that the approach should be a species of political economy. The relevant question, then, concerns the form of political economy to be employed.

One of the most striking recent innovations in the study of agrarian politics was advanced by Samuel L. Popkin: the application to this field of the theory of rational choice.[58] In choosing a form of political economy, I would draw upon this foundation. Moreover, I would be guided by the properties of the subject we are seeking to analyze.

Consideration of these properties quickly leads to a rejection of two major forms of political economy: conventional micro-economics and standard radical approaches. The study of agrarian politics reveals the limited relevance of voluntary exchange: economic coercion is a fact of everyday life. The study of rural communities reveals as well the significance of institutions other than markets. And the study of agricultural policy-making demonstrates that consideration of objectives other than economic efficiency drives the selection of policies and forms of policy intervention. Clearly, then, conventional

economics provides a weak foundation for the study of agrarian political economy. Radical political economy does little better. Consideration of the fate of the peasantry demonstrates that effective class action is problematic. And the analysis of public policy reveals that a theory of politics cannot rest on the presumption of historical materialism; political intervention as frequently retards the growth of productive forces as promotes it. In the absence of either motive force, then, political action is difficult to analyze from a Marxian point of view. In conjunction with our reservations concerning the wisdom of linking political economy to the presumption of the decline of agrarianism, these considerations undermine our faith in most radical approaches.

A useful place to turn is to the literature on collective choice.[59] Based upon the application of rational choice analysis to non-market institutions, this form of political economy offers useful insights at both the macro- and the micro- levels. Indeed, a major problem with the field as presently defined is that the micro-literature stands apart from and in partial opposition to the macro-literature; and as has been shown, the source of this dissent is largely methodological. A major attraction of the collective choice approach is that it promises to reintegrate the two within a common methodological framework -- an argument which we shall pursue further below.

"Macro-" Level Topics:

While abandoning the dynamic, transformational approach to the political economy of development, we nonetheless seek a method of analyzing the political process of resource allocation in poor societies, both within the rural sector and between the rural and other sectors. The collective choice perspective offers a variety of tools for analyzing this process.

(i) The study of pressure groups: Clearly a major factor influencing the allocation of resources in agrarian societies is the interplay of organized interests. All that has been said thus far underscores their significance. One reason that the collective choice approach offers so appealing an alternative to the present forms of political economy is that it possesses a well developed theory of collective action.[60] Not only does the approach therefore offer insight into the creation and conduct of organized interests. But also it helps to comprehend why some interests are more likely to receive organized expression than are others. Clearly, this is of significance to the study of agrarian politics. For, while farmers constitute the majority of the citizens of the developing nations, their interests are frequently defeated in the struggle for control of the state. The outcome that one would expect to result from the impact of political majorities is, in fact, repeatedly overborne by the impact of organized minorities.[61] Because the collective choice approach offers insight into the relative ability of interests to organize and so influence the allocational behavior of governments, it therefore promises to make a

significant contribution to our understanding of the inter-sectoral patterns of economic bias characteristic of the developing nations. By the same token, it would appear to offer an alternative theoretical basis for explaining the rise of industry and the marginalization of agriculture -- one grounded on micro-foundations rather than on the simplistic projection forward of trends observed in the past histories of the industrial nations of the world.

(ii) Political competition: A second major concern in collective choice is with the analysis of political competition. Its practitioners have analyzed the incentives created for the formation of public policies by politicians' searches for the support of political majorities.[62] While skepticism can justifiably be cast upon efforts to extend to the developing world theoretical insights drawn from electoral models of party competition, this skepticism should not dissuade us from benefiting from the important insights this literature can provide. Popular impressions notwithstanding, the electoral mechanism is in fact frequently employed in third-world nations to mediate claims for high office. It should therefore be analyzed. The developing nations are largely agrarian in composition and farmers therefore constitute electoral majorities. What is the impact of this configuration of votes? Are there, for example, "electoral cycles" in such things as credit programs, pricing policies, or agricultural subsidies? Secondly, insofar as the electoral mechanism is in fact abandoned, does this make a difference? Does the disenfranchisement of rural majorities matter? Do, for example, countries adopt different

agricultural policies when they shift to military rule? Lastly, in many developing nations, elections do remain in place, but take place outside the framework of party competition. One-party systems are common. One challenge is to develop the tools with which to represent the effect of electoral competition within single-party systems -- i.e. to elaborate upon the theory. Another is to employ existing tools to analyze the consequences for public policy of the quest for majority support <u>within</u> the ruling party.

(iii) The study of public agencies: Precisely because the set of issues surrounding the development of agriculture has been so intensely politicized, government intervention and control is a common place feature of the rural economies of third-world nations. Bureaucracies span and regulate many of the markets of relevance to farmers: the markets for the commodities they sell, the inputs they employ, and goods they purchase for consumption purposes. The collective choice approach attempts to analyze the ways in which allocational decisions are taken in non-market environments, i.e. in settings in which bureaucratic or political institutions regulate the allocational process. In the literature, there are attempts to understand how those seeking to maximize their incomes would manipulate such bureaucracies;[63] how public officials who seek non-economic objectives (such as political support) would manage them;[64] and how the bureaucrats themselves shape the behavior of public agencies.[65] Where the public sector is so deeply involved in the allocation of economic resources, it is extremely important that analysts turn to this

literature in attempts to understand the political origins of economic choices.

Micro-Level Concerns:

But what of the "micro-" literature? An important feature of this literature is that it dissents. Those who do peasant studies attack capitalism; the sociologists, for their part, critique the literature on peasant studies; and both attack "economist" theories of human behavior. How are we to meet this challenge?

In part, the collective choice approach meets the challenge by co-opting it. A basic criticism of the micro-literature is the allegation of economic reductionism; as argued most vividly by Polanyi, Dalton, and others, allocational decisions in small-scale societies are often made outside of markets, and the application of the laws of supply and demand with the resultant formation of prices is often of little use in studying social decisions.[66] A second criticism is aimed at the premise of methodological individualism; the sociological tradition denies the relevance of the individual as the unit of analysis and instead stresses the significance of social institutions. What is striking is the degree to which the collective choice school concurs in these criticisms. By focusing on the way in which non-market institutions aggregate preferences into collective social outcomes, it approaches the study of human behavior in a manner which these critics of market-economies should find congenial. It therefore holds forth the prospect of reintegrating the micro- and macro- materials on rural societies in developing nations.

Not only does the collective choice school co-opt key elements in these positions; it also imparts now excitement to them. One way in which it does so is by offering new tools for the study of social institutions. Employing the assumption of rational behavior, scholars can ask: In the context of a given institutional environment, how are people likely to behave? An example of such analysis is Chinn's work on communal institutions in rural China; Putterman's examination of village decision-making in Tanzania stands as another.[67] Posner's analysis of the economic role of kinship in "traditional" societies and my own examination of the political role of kinship among the Nuer represent other attempts, as do the numerous studies of sharecropping and tenancy.[68]

Viewing institutions as means for securing desired ends gives rise to new questions -- ones which should also promote a convergence between sociology and political economy. While sociologists tend to describe the social institutions prevailing in particular locales and to portray their variety across different societies, the collective choice theorist is driven to ask: Why, in this situation, does this institution reign instead of any of these others? And under what circumstances will a given institution be replaced by another? The issue being raised is thus one of institutional adoption and change. In my own work, I have examined hypotheses about why kingships and chieftancies replaced kinship systems in Africa; Levi, Zolberg, North and Thomas, Friedman and others have raised similar questions for pre-industrial Europe.[69] Popkin, Siamwalla, and others have examined the

circumstances under which markets will be replaced by hierarchies, such as bureaucracies or patron-client relations, in agrarian settings.[70] In so far as sociologists and collective choice analysts come to work together, this type of investigation is bound to a more prominent place in the research agenda in development studies.

An interesting irony should now be apparent. A major reason for moving to the collective choice approach, it will be recalled, was to locate a form of political economy which could be applied to agrarian societies but which did not subscribe to the transformational presumption which underlay conventional definitions of development. Nonetheless, what I am now arguing is that the collective choice perspective does in fact facilitate the study of change. The major difference is that it does so from a micro- perspective. Rather than positing "laws of motion" for whole societies, it instead sees institutional change as being engineered by individuals seeking the attainment of objectives.

Already, we are learning about such changes; the research agenda should simply require that we learn more. Some institutional changes, we have learned, represent the results of coercion: collective property, village dwelling, and communal forms of government, for example, may represent mechanisms put in place by states seeking to extract resources from rural populations. They represent, in effect, instruments of taxation.[71] But the use of rational choice theory also suggests that many of these institutions may have evolved in a Darwinian manner: being more efficient, they may have out-competed and

displaced alternative institutional forms. This interpretation is, of course, in keeping with historical materialism and its neo-classical alternative: the new institutional economics.[72] But it is also apparent that some of these institutions have been consciously innovated. In the manner of a social contract, they may have been put in place in an effort at constitutional design and so have been supplied in an attempt to give institutional underpinning to more desirable social states.[73] The study and characterization of such institutional transformations should also feature on the research agenda.

Conclusion

This paper has reviewed the study of agrarian politics in development studies. It has located its origins in the intellectual and political disruptions of the 1960s. It has argued that the major impact of the study of agrarian politics has been to transform the study of political development into the study of political economy. The paper has expressed dissatisfaction with the dominant forms of political economy applied to the study of rural societies, however, and has advocated the use of an alternative approach: that of collective choice. One attraction of this alternative, it argued, is that while it does not require the strong assumption of "aggregate transformation," it nonetheless offers significant insights into the forms of political struggle characteristic of rural societies. Another is that it offers the promise of bridging the macro- and micro-traditions in the study of agrarian politics and of reintegrating the

two within a common framework.

The political power of the peasantry moved rural societies from the periphery to the center of development studies. The power of the study of agrarian societies to stimulate new ways of analyzing the politics of the developing areas may well keep them there.

NOTES

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4. Thomas Hodgkin, Nationalism in Colonial Africa (New York: New York University Press, 1957) and Immanuel Wallerstein, Africa: The Politics of Independence (New York: Vintage Books, 1961).
5. See such diverse contributions as Joseph La Palombara, ed., Bureaucracy and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963); Warren F. Ilchman and Norman Thomas

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11. See such diverse works as Anthony Oberschall, Social Conflict and Social Movements (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1973); Mancur Olson, "Rapid Growth as a Destabilizing Force," Journal of Economic History 23 (December 1963):529-32; and Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1968).

12. See such works as Lucian W. Pye, Guerilla Communism in Malaysia: Its Social and Political Meaning (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956); Paul Berman, Revolutionary Organization: Institution-Building within the People's Liberation Armed Forces (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1974); and also Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order. There is, of course, a deep debt to be paid to Leon Trotsky, The Russian Revolution (Garden City, NY: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1959) and Philip Selznik, The Organizational Weapon: A Study of Bolshevik Strategy and Tactics (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1952).

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36. See the discussion, for example, in David Mitrany, Marx Against the Peasant (New York: Collier Books, 1961).

37. Goran Hyden, Beyond Ujamaa (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1980).

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54. Contrast, by example, the divergent -- but equally rapid -- patterns of agricultural development documented in Yujiro Hayami and Vernon Ruttan, Agricultural Development: An International Perspective (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1971).

55. See the sources in notes 27, 28 and 31.

56. See, for example, Steven N. S. Cheung, The Theory of Share Tenancy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969) and the outpouring of articles published in response to this work (e.g. David M. G. Newbery, "The Choice of Rental Contract in Peasant Agriculture," in Lloyd G. Reynolds, Agriculture in Development Theory (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1978)).

57. Specimen contributions would include Willis L. Peterson, "International Farm Prices and the Social Cost of Cheap Food Prices," American Journal of Agricultural Economics 61 (1979):12-21; Malcolm Bale and Ernst Lutz, "Price Distortion and Their Effects: An International Comparison," World Bank Staff Working Paper no. 359, 1979; Ian Little, Tibor Scitovsky, and Maurice Scott, Industry and Trade in Some Developing Countries (London: Oxford University Press, 1970); Guillermo O'Donnell, "State and Alliances in Argentina, 1956-1976," Journal of Development Studies 15 (October 1978):3-33; Robert H. Bates, Markets and States in Tropical Africa: The Political Basis of Agricultural Policies (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1981);

and chapter 5 of Robert H. Bates, Essays on the Political Economy of Rural Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).

58. Popkin, The Rational Peasant. See also Robert H. Bates, Rural Responses to Industrialization: A Study of Village Zambia (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1976).

59. I distinguish the collective from the public choice literature on the grounds that the latter remains more closely tied to conventional economics. This is revealed, for example, in the tendency of public choice theorists to regard politics as a form of "social cost" and (which leads to the same result) gains from trade as being costless to organize. Economically efficient outcomes remain the basic reference point for most investigations. Collective choice differs in that it tends to engage in positive analysis; it examines the choices that will be made by rational agents in non-market institutions. Normative considerations -- e.g. departures from efficient outcomes -- tend to represent a secondary concern.

60. The classic text is Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971); see also Brian Barry and Russell Harden, Rational Man and Irrational Society? (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1982).

61. See, for example, Bates, Markets and States.

62. The basic texts on this literature are Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper and Row, 1957) and William H. Riker and Peter C. Odeshook An Introduction to Positive

Political Theory (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1973). An extremely interesting application of this reasoning to non-electoral settings is James DeNardo, Power in Numbers: The Political Strategy of Protest and Rebellion. See also the literature on the effect of partisan forces on economic policy. A good introduction is gary C. Jacobson and Samuel Kernell, Strategy and Choice in Congressional Elections (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1981) and a good critical overview is offered in James E. Alt and K. Alec Chrystal, Political Economics (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1983).

63. See, for example, George Stigler, "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 3 (1971):211-40.

64. Morris Fiorina and Roger Noll, "Voters, Legislators and Bureaucrats," Journal of Political Economy 9 (1978):239-54; Barry R. Weingast, Kenneth A. Shepsle, and Christopher Johnsen, "The Political Economy of Benefits and Costs," Journal of Political Economy 89 (1981):642-64; Matthew McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz, "Congressional Oversight Overlooked," American Journal of Political Science (February 1984), forthcoming.

65. W. A. Niskanen, Bureaucracy and Representative Government (Chicago: Aldine-Atherton, 1971). See also, Gary Miller and Terry M. Moe, "Bureaucrats, Legislators, and the Size of Government," American Political Science Review, 77 (June 1983):297-322; and Albert Breton and Ronald Wintrobe, The Logic of

Bureaucratic Conduct (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982).

66. Karl Polanyi, Trade and Market in Early Empires (New York: The Free Press, 1957); George Dalton, ed. Tribal and Peasant Economies (Garden City, NY: Natural History Press, 1967).

67. Dennis L. Chinn, "Team Cohesion and Collective Labor Supply in Chinese Agriculture," Journal of Comparative Economics 3 (1979):375-94; Louis Putterman, "Is Democratic Collective Agriculture Possible? Theoretical Considerations and Evidence from Tanzania," Journal of Development Studies (forthcoming).

68. See chapter 1 of Bates, Essays. Richard Posner, "A Theory of Primitive Society," Journal of Law and Economics 23 (1980):1-53. The most comprehensive review of the sharecropping literature is contained in the forthcoming revised edition of Yujiro Hayami and Vernon Ruttan, Agricultural Development.

69. Chapter 2 of Bates, Essays. Margaret Levi, "The Predatory Theory of Rule," Politics and Society 10 (1981):431-66; Aristide Zolberg, "Strategic Interactions and the Formation of Modern States: France and England," International Social Science Journal 32 (1980):687-716; Douglass C. North and Robert Paul Thomas, The Rise of the Western World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973); and David Friedman, "A Theory of the Size and Shape of Nations," Journal of Political Economy 85 (1977):59-77

70. Samuel L. Popkin, "Public Choice and Rural Development," in Public Choice and Rural Development, eds. Clifford Russell and Norman

Nicholson (Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future, 1981); Ammar Siamwalla, "An Economic Theory of Patron-Client Relations (Paper prepared for Thai-European Seminar on Social Change in Contemporary China, April 1980). See also Oliver Williamson, "The Modern Corporation: Origin, Evolution, Attributes," Journal of Economic Literature 19 (December 1981):1537-68.

71. See, for example, Philip Hoffman, "Social History and Taxes: The Case of Early Modern France," California Social Science Working Paper no. 495, October 1983; Katherine Norberg, "The Amoral Economy of Echallon: An Eighteenth-Century Community from the Perspective of Its Seigneurial Court," paper presented to the California Institute of Technology/Weingart Conference, 6 May 1983; Robert H. Bates, "Some Conventional Orthodoxies in the Study of Agrarian Change," California Institute of Technology Social Science Working Paper no. 458, December 1983.

72. Interesting examples of this form of reasoning are offered not only by Marxist historians (see G. A. Cohen, Karl Marx's Theory of History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978)) and the new institutional economics (for example, North and Thomas, The Rise of the Western World), but also in such interesting works as Posner, "A Theory of Primitive Society"; Robert Axelrod, "The Emergence of Cooperation among Egoists," American Political Science Review 75 (June 1981):306-18.

73. This is the point of view advanced by such anthropologists as Elizabeth Colson. See Elizabeth Colson, Tradition and Contract (Chicago: Aldine, 1974).